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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is from a final order and judgment of a district 
court pursuant to Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This 
Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to the Constitution 
of Utah, Art. VIII, Sections 3 and 5, and U.C.A. 78-2-2 (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A. Whether the trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law 
that "as a commercial landlord, Freeport [Appellee] does not owe a 
duty of reasonable care to its tenants to protect against loss of 
1 
or damage to property," especially in light of this Court's 
previous rulings including Williams v. Melbv, 699 P. 2d 723, 726 
(Utah 1985) which held that "this Court has charged landlords with 
a duty to exercise reasonable care toward their tenants in all 
circumstances." (R.. 1496, 1536). (References designated by the 
letter "R" in this Brief are to the original record as paginated by 
the Record Index which was mailed to this Court by the trial court 
on or about March 27, 2001). 
Standard of Review: Inasmuch as a challenge to summary 
judgment presents for review conclusions of law only, the appellate 
court reviews the conclusions for correctness, without deference to 
the trial court's legal conclusions. Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 
497 (Utah 1989) . 
B. Whether the trial court erred in ruling that "Freeport 
[Appellee] had no duty to protect its tenant's property from theft 
by third persons," especially in light of this Court's previous 
rulings including Williams v. Melby, supra, and Mitchell v. Pearson 
Enterprises, 697 P. 2d 240, 246 (Utah 1985) which held that "the 
fact that the instrumentality which produced the injury . . . was 
the criminal conduct of a third person would not preclude a finding 
of proximate cause if the intervening agency was itself a 
foreseeable act." (R. 1496, 1536). 
Standard of Review: Bonham v. Morgan, supra. 
C. Whether the trial court erred in refusing, as ci matter of 
law, to look beyond the contract between the parties and consider 
the particular facts of this case in determining whether a landlord 
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(Appellee) had a duty to protect its tenant (Appellant) from loss 
or harm, especially in light of previous Utah appellate decisions 
including Schreiter v. Wasatch Manor, Inc., 871 P.2d 570, 575 (Utah 
App. 1994) which held that in a landlord-tenant relationship, "the 
care to be exercised in any particular case depends on the 
circumstances of that case and on the extent of foreseeable danger 
and must be determined as a question of fact." (R. 1496, 1536). 
Standard of Review: Bonham v. Morgan, supra. Also, the party 
against whom summary judgment has been granted is entitled to have 
all facts and all inferences fairly rising therefrom considered in 
a light most favorable to him. Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 
104 (Utah 1991). 
D. Whether the trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law 
that the Lease Agreement between the parties "does not require 
Freeport [Appellee] to provide security for Enercofs [Appellant] 
goods and it does not require Freeport to provide theft insurance 
for the benefit of Enerco." (R. 1535). 
Standard of Review: Bonham v. Morgan, supra. 
E. Whether the trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law 
that (1) Appellant should not have been covered by Appellee's 
insurance, (2) that "Freeport [Appellee] did not have a duty to 
obtain or maintain insurance which would cover Enerco [Appellant] 
for any loss caused by theft" and (3) that Appellee "had no 
contractual or common-law duty to provide that insurance to 
Enerco," especially in light of Utah appellate decisions including 
GNS Partnership v. Fullmer, 873 P.2d 1157,1161 (Utah App. 1994) 
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which held that "the landlord's insurance is presumed to be held 
for the tenant's benefit as a co-insured in the absence of an 
express agreement to the contrary." (R. 1536). 
Standard of Review: Bonham v. Morgan, supra. 
F. Whether the trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law 
that "the GNS Partnership v. Fullmer case cited by Enerco is 
inapplicable to the facts of this case." (R. 1495, 1536). 
Standard of Review: Bonham v. Morgan, supra. 
G. Whether the trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law 
that "Freeport [Appellee] is not in the business of storing goods, 
for hire and with respect to Enercofs [Appellant's] goods, was not 
acting as a warehouseman as contemplated by the UCC." (R. 1493, 
1535). 
Standard of Review: Bonham v. Morgan, supra; Winegar v. 
Froerer Corp., supra. 
H. Whether the trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law 
that "Freeport [Appellee] did not owe Enerco [Appellant] the 
statutory, common law or contract duties of a warehouseman." (R. 
1493, 1535). 
Standard of Review: Id. 
I. Whether the trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law 
that "the lease agreement between the parties did not create a 
lease subject to the terms of the UCC," that "U.C.A. 70A-2a-101, 
et. seq., including 70A-2a-218 and 219, do not apply in this case," 
and that summary judgment was appropriate "as to any of Enerco!s 
claims based on the UCC." (R. 1535). 
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Standard of Review: Id. 
J, Whether the trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law 
that Freeport [Appellee] did not breach any provision of the 
written lease? (R. 1535). 
Standard of Review: Id. 
In addition to the cases cited, this Court has ruled that a 
trial court's conclusions of law are reviewed under a correction of 
error standard. Jacobsen Inv. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n., 839 P.2d 
789 (Utah 1992). Issues of law are reviewed giving no deference to 
the views of the lower court. See, e.g., English v. Kienke, 774 
P.2d 1154 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), aff'd, 848 P.2d 153 (Utah 1993). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Appellant contends that the following Constitutional 
provisions, statutes and rules are determinative or of central 
importance to this appeal: 
1. Constitution of Utah, Art, I, Sec, 11; 
All courts shall be open, and every person, 
for an injury done to him in his person, 
property or reputation, shall have remedy by 
due course of law, which shall be administered 
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no 
person shall be barred from prosecuting or 
defending before any tribunal in this state, 
by himself or counsel, any civil cause to 
which he is a party. 
2. Constitution of Utah, Art, I, Sec, 24: 
All laws of a general nature shall have 
uniform operation. 
3. U,C.A, S70A-l-102m (Uniform Commercial Code): 
This act shall be liberally construed and 
applied to promote its underlying purposes and 
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policies. 
4. U.C.A. S70A-7-102mm: 
"Goods" means all things which are treated as 
moveable for the purposes of a contract of 
storage or transportation, 
5. U.C.A. S70A-7-102fm: 
"Warehouseman" is a person engaged in the 
business of storing goods for hire. 
6. U.C.A. S70A-7-204m; 
A warehouseman is liable for damages for loss 
of or injury to the goods caused by his 
failure to exercise such care in regard to 
them as a reasonably careful man would 
exercise under like circumstances but unless 
otherwise agreed he is not liable for damages 
which could not have been avoided by the 
exercise of such care. 
7. Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
The judgment sought shall be rendered if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with any affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In this case, Appellant, Enerco, Inc. (hereinafter "Enerco") 
leased a large commercial building from Appellee, Freeport Center 
Associates (hereinafter "Freeport") pursuant to a written Lease 
Agreement. After several million dollars of property was stolen 
from the commercial building, Enerco brought suit against Freeport 
and others. (The relevant facts will be discussed in more detail 
in the "Statement of Facts" below.) 
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After the case was filed, Enerco reached settlement agreements 
with SOS Staffing Services, Inc., Atlas Steel, Inc., and Wasatch 
Metal, Inc., and those three defendants were dismissed from this 
suit (R. 637, 1220 and 1227). After written discovery commenced, 
Freeport filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 1234). 
After hearing oral argument, the trial court published its 
"Ruling on Defendant Freeport Centerfs Motion for Summary Judgment" 
(R. 1490), and Freeport submitted a proposed Order. Appellant 
filed a "Notice of Objection to Defendant's Proposed Order and 
Judgment Regarding Freeport Center's Motion for Summary Judgment" 
(R. 1511) which requested that in signing the Order granting 
summary judgment, the trial court should (1) make an express 
determination that there was no just reason for delay and make an 
express direction for the entry of final judgment pursuant to Rule 
54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and (2) stay further 
proceedings in the trial court, pending this appeal, against the 
only other remaining defendant (L. Bloom & Son, Ogden) because the 
claims against that defendant were completely separate from those 
against Freeport. 
The trial court granted Enerco's request and certified its 
Order as final in a "Final Order, Judgment and Stay" (R. 1534). 
After the summary judgment was entered against Enerco, the trial 
court's "Final Order, Judgment and Stay" was appealed to this 
Court. All procedural requirements including filing of the Notice 
of Appeal and filing of the Docketing Statement have been timely 
fulfilled. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Enerco is a Delaware corporation which is in the 
business of purchasing equipment and other materials categorized as 
"surplus" from rhe U.S. Government in large "lots" and then 
reselling those items to many other individuals, governments and 
business entities throughout the world. (R. 646-47, 1353-54). 
2. Beginning in 1993 (and then for successive periods 
thereafter), Freeport and Enerco entered into a written Lease 
Agreement by which Enerco leased one of many large warehouses 
located in Appellant's commercial facility (known as the Freeport, 
Center) in Clearfield, Utah. Pursuant to that Lease Agreement, 
Enerco paid Freeport a monthly fee to store many millions of 
dollars worth of equipment and materials in the wctrehouse for 
future sales to its worldwide customers. (R. 647, 1354). 
3. In late 1995, plaintiff!s Managing Director, James 
Kim, was going on an extended trip overseas, and because he would 
not be in Utah, he terminated all temporary employees so that no 
one would be in or have access to the building. (R. 649, 1354). 
4. After Kim left town, a former temporary employee, 
originally provided by defendant SOS, returned to the warehouse*, 
gained access through the back door, and began stealing large 
amounts of goods and materials stored in the warehouse. (R. 649, 
1354). 
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5. Over the next many days, numerous other individuals 
entered onto Freeport's property and into the warehouse with 
trailers, flatbed trucks and other vehicles to remove Enerco!s 
property. (R. 649, 1354). 
6. Freeport!s front office knew that Mr. Kim often went 
overseas on extended trips, and also knew that while he was on such 
trips, no one worked in or entered into Enercofs warehouse. 
Indeed, when Mr. Kim went on such trips, he would leave his keys to 
the warehouse with Freeport fs front office so that no one else 
could gain access to the warehouse. (R. 1423, 1354-55). 
7. Prior to leaving on the above-referenced trip, Mr. 
Kim specifically informed Freeport's management that he would be 
out of town for an extended period of time and, as was his usual 
practice, he gave Freeportfs management his keys so that no one 
else could gain access to his building. All of the thefts in 
question occurred while Freeport had plaintiff's keys and knew he 
was out of town. (R. 1423, 1354-55). See also Affidavit of James 
Kim, par. 13, (R. 1422-23); Answer No. 3 to Freeport fs 
Interrogatories, attached as Ex. "A" to "Plaintiff's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Freeport Center Associates1 Motion for Summary 
Judgment (R. 1382-86). 
8. As indicated above, the thieves transported the 
stolen goods by using, among other things, a flatbed trailer. 
However, that trailer was pulled by a white Cadillac, with out-of-
state license plates, and the property and materials on the trailer 
were not even covered. SOS's former employee admitted to the 
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thefts and provided information regarding thefts by other people. 
He participated in taking more than twenty trailer loads of 
Enerco!s property out of the warehouse and indicated that as they 
drove by Freeport's security guards at the gate, those guards made 
no effort whatsoever to stop them and simply waved as they left the 
premises again and again. (R. 649-50, 1355). See also Transcript 
of Statement given by Larry Davis, attached as Exhibit "B" to 
"Memorandum in Support of Freeport Center Associates1 Motion for 
Summary Judgment" (R. 1284-85). 
9. S0Sfs former employee who stole much of the property" 
stated that as they would approach Freeportf s guards at the gate 
with these loads, he would tell his cohort: 
Hey, there's no way we can drive out of here 
with it like this, my God, it's just hanging 
off the truck, and we drove right out the door 
and a guy waved at us going out the gate, 
right out the main gate. 
(Id.). 
10. The materials piled on the trailers cind "hanging 
off" included large unique and readily-identifiable items such as * 
aircraft wings, military tug vehicles, and large military 
generators. (R. 1284-85, 1355). 
11. The Lease Agreement fully acknowledged that Enerco 
would "use the premises for . . . storage and distribution of 
Tenant's products and materials." Freeport's management was aware 
of the unique type of equipment and materials Enerco had in the 
warehouse, and was also aware of the large volume of that 
equipment. (Lease Agreement, par. 2 (R. 1269); Affidavit of James 
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Kim, par, 5, (R. 1421)). 
12. By the time Mr. Kim returned from overseas, a large 
amount of property, the value of which is estimated to be in excess 
of $7 million, had been stolen from the warehouse and disposed of 
by various businesses and recyclers, including those named as 
defendants in this case. (R. 651, 1355). 
13. At the time the lease was entered into, Mr. Kim 
spoke with Freeport fs Manager and because of the high value of 
Enerco's property, specifically questioned him about security at 
the Freeport Center. Freeportfs Manager gave Mr. Kim verbal 
assurances and representations regarding the security at the 
Freeport Center. Among other things, Mr. Kim was told that there 
would be security guards protecting the gate at the Freeport 
Center, that "there is ample security here," that Enerco's property 
would be safe, and that he had never heard of anyone stealing from 
Freeport's tenants. (James Kim Affidavit, par. 7, R. 1421). 
14. These statements were important to Mr. Kim in 
deciding to store Enerco's valuable goods at the Freeport Center, 
and he relied upon them in making the decision to do so. (James 
Kim Affidavit, par. 8. R. 1421). 
15. Mr. Kim was also given other materials at the time 
the lease arrangements were made. In those materials, it was 
unequivocally stated, among other things, that "Freeport Center is 
protected by five miles of ten foot chain link fencing" and "a 
roving security guard patrols the center's 735 acres on weekends, 
at night and on holidays." (James Kim Affidavit, par. 9, R. 1422). 
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16. The materials given to Mr. Kim also represent that 
Freeport is protected by "an electronic surveillance system" which 
is connected with "the Freeport Center Administrative Offices and 
patrol vehicle." James Kim also relied on these materials and the 
representations and promises made therein. (James Kim Affidavit, 
par. 10, R. 1422). 
17. While Mr. Kim was gone on his long overseas trip, 
thieves also gained access to the building by kicking in the back 
door, and one of the big metal lift-up doors "had been kicked into 
pieces in order to gain access." (R. 1301, 1358). 
18. Regarding insurance, the Lease Agreement specified: 
Tenant will not permit the demised 
premises to be used for any purpose . 
which would cause an increase in insurance 
premiums, render the insurance thereon void or 
cause cancellation thereof. 
(R. 1269). 
19. The Lease Agreement further specified regarding 
insurance that: 
Tenant shall also pay to Landlord any amount 
by which the property insurance premiums 
allocable to the demised premises for any year 
during the term of this Lease exceed the 
annual premium . . . presently paid by 
Landlord for the demised premises prior to 
Tenant's occupancy. . . . Landlord will 
provide Tenant with a complete computation of 
any premium increase on the demised premises 
and within thirty (30) days thereafter Tenant 
will pay Landlord the insurance premium 
increase as set forth in the computation. 
(R. 1271). 
20. The Lease Agreement further specified regarding 
insurance that: 
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Landlord and Tenant each further warrant that 
insurance companies insuring Landlord or 
Tenant shall have no rights against the other, 
whether by assignment, subrogation or 
otherwise. 
(R. 1272). 
21. The Lease Agreement specified that 
ff[iInterpretation, construction and performance of this Lease shall 
be governed by the laws of Utah." (R. 1275). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Utah law mandates that Landlords have duties to exercise 
reasonable care "in all circumstances." This Court has 
unequivocally held that with regard to landlord cases, "the care to 
be exercised in any particular case depends on the circumstances of 
that case and on the extent of foreseeable danger involved, and 
must be determined as a question of fact." The trial court erred 
in holding, as a matter of law, that Freeport had no duty of 
reasonable care to Enerco. 
It was certainly foreseeable that Freeportfs failure to 
provide adequate security would allow, if not encourage, exactly 
what occurred in this case. Furthermore, Freeport1s general duty 
in this case was increased by the fact that it actually undertook 
to render security services by providing guards at the gate, roving 
security guards, etc. 
Utah law requires that "the landlord's insurance is presumed 
to be held for the tenant's benefit as a co-insured in the absence 
of an express agreement to the contrary." In this case, no such 
agreement to the contrary exists and in fact, the Lease Agreement 
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makes it clear that the parties contemplated insurance being in 
place and that no subrogation rights would exist against each 
other, as is required in all co-insured situations. 
Freepcrt owed Snerco the duties of a warehouseman, and is 
statutorily liable for the loss of Enerco's goods. The actions set 
forth herein breached the contract between the parties, and any 
ambiguities must be construed against Freeport. For all of these 
reasons, an award of summary judgment was inappropriate. 
ARGUMENT 
Introduction 
The trial court failed to consider and apply the strict 
standards which must be applied to summary judgment motions. This 
Court has unequivocally held that "summary judgment is proper only 
if the pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admissions show that 
there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Bowen v. 
Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982), emphasis added. This 
Court has also mandated that 
If there is any doubt or uncertainty 
concerning questions of fact, the doubt should 
be resolved in favor of the opposing party. 
Thus, the court must evaluate all the evidence 
and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn 
from the evidence in a light most favorable to 
the party opposing summary judgment. 
Id. at 436, see also Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1977). 
Finally, this Court has held that when the case involves claims of 
negligence, summary judgment "is appropriate only in the most 
clear-cut case." Bowen, supra at 436. 
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Enerco offered overwhelming evidence to the trial court that 
Freeport was negligent in this case. When that evidence is further 
viewed "in a light most favorable" to Enerco and when "any doubt or 
uncertainty concerning questions of fact" is resolved in Enerco's 
favor, as it must be, Freeportfs motion should have been denied. 
As is discussed below, the agreements in question, Utah 
statutory law, and Utah case law all required Freeport to properly 
protect plaintiff's property- Reasonable minds could certainly 
differ as to whether Freeport did so. For example, reasonable 
minds could differ as to whether Freeport!s guards should have been 
suspicious of a Cadillac with out-of-state plates pulling a flat-
bed trailer, driven by unkempt individuals with long hair, driving 
past the guards more than twenty times with Enercofs aircraft 
wings, sensitive electronics equipment, military tug vehicles, and 
plaintiff's other high-tech military equipment loaded on the back 
and hanging off the sides. As indicated in the statement of facts 
above, even the thieves themselves were shocked that the guards did 
nothing and just repeatedly waved to them as they drove out. 
Reasonable minds could certainly differ as to whether the 
security guards should have waved at this spectacle when Freeport 
knew no one else in the facility had this type of equipment, that 
it had plaintiff's keys, that James Kim was out of town, and that 
there was no reason to be moving his inventory because he had not 
ended his lease. Reasonable minds could certainly differ whether 
Freeport!s promised "roving security guards" should have seen the 
large metal door to plaintiff's warehouse repeatedly kicked in and 
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in pieces. Reasonable minds could certainly diff€*r why the 
"surveillance system" Freeport had promised was not in operation 
and whether it would have prevented the thefts from occurring. 
?oiat I* Saerco's Negligence Claim was Improperly Dismissed 
The trial court incorrectly ordered that Enerco's negligence 
claim should be dismissed. Its basis for doing so was its holding 
that "[a]s a commercial landlord, Freeport does not owe a duty of 
reasonable care to its tenants to protect against loss of or damage 
to property" and its related holding that "Freeport had no duty to 
protect its tenant's property from third persons, except as may 
arise by agreement of the parties." (R. 1536). 
Utah case law has repeatedly recognized the common law duty of 
a landlord to protect its tenants. In Hall v. Warren, 632 P.2d 848 
(Utah 1981), this Court flatly stated that "the duty of the 
landlord to use reasonable care to protect lessees may rest on 
common law principles of negligence." Id. at 850. 
In Williams v. Melbv, 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985), this Court 
enlarged those duties and noted that "the common law duty of a 
landlord has been expanded in virtually every state, either 
judicially or by statute, beyond the narrow common law categories." 
Id. at 726. The Court explained that "this court has charged 
landlords with a duty to exercise reasonable care toward their 
tenants in all circumstances. Landlord liability is no longer 
limited by the artificial categories developed by the common law." 
Id. at 726, emphasis added. 
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This Court also noted that "in the instant case, the 
landlord's duty was to use reasonable care" and then made the 
significant ruling that "whether a defendant has breached the 
required standard of care is generally a question for the jury," 
Id, at 727. Important to this case is the fact that the Court also 
held that "summary judgment should be granted with great caution in 
negligence cases" (Id., at 725) and then concluded that "the care to 
be exercised in any particular case depends upon the circumstances 
of that case and on the extent of foreseeable danger involved and 
must be determined as a question of fact." Id. at 727, emphasis 
added. 
As indicated above, "the care to be exercised in any 
particular case depends upon . . . the extent of foreseeable danger 
involved," and this is equally true when, as in this case, the 
injury was produced by the criminal conduct of a third person. For 
example, in Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises, 697 P.2d 240 (Utah 
1985), this Court discussed the duties of innkeepers to their 
clients and clearly held that "the fact that the instrumentality 
which produced the injury . . . was the criminal conduct of a third 
person would not preclude a finding of proximate cause if the 
intervening agency was itself a foreseeable act. JEd. at 246. 
Like the innkeeper in Mitchell, Freeport is a commercial 
entity which, for a set fee, provides temporary premises to a 
client for a fixed period of time. In Mitchell, this Court 
explained that innkeepers owe a duty of "ordinary care to see that 
the premises assigned to [clients] are reasonably safe for their 
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use and occupancy." J^ d. at 243, Regarding the issue of 
negligence, this Court held that "it is foreseeable that an 
innkeeper's failure to maintain adequate security measures not only 
permits but may sven encourage intruders to rob . . . hotel 
patrons." Id., emphasis added. This Court then stated: "Thus, in 
meeting its standard of ordinary care, a hotel must provide 
security commensurate with the facts and circumstances that are or 
should be apparent to the ordinary prudent person." Id., emphasis 
added. 
It is important to note that both innkeepers and warehouses s 
are also specifically categorized by Utah law as "public servants" 
who "may not contract to escape potential liabilities for their 
ordinary negligence." Russ v. Woodside Homes, Inc., 905 P.2d 901f 
907 (Utah App. 1995). If it is foreseeable that a hotel's "failure 
to maintain adequate security measures" would not only permit, but 
"may even encourage intruders to rob" clients, it is certainly 
foreseeable that the exact same failure would at least permit, and 
probably encourage intruders to do the same at the Freeport Center. 
A nation-wide review of cases indicates that other states have 
also extended landlords1 duties in cases specifically involving the 
criminal conduct of third persons. For example, in Braitman v. 
Overlook Terrace Corp., 132 N.J. Super. 51, 332 A. 2d 212 (1974), 
the court, referring to other state and federal cases, stated that 
"a landlord does owe a duty to take reasonable steps to protect a 
tenant from foreseeable criminal acts committed by third persons." 
Id. at 214. 
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In Vermes v. American Dist. Tel. Co., 251 N.W.2d 101 (Minn. 
1977), the Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed a case in which, as in 
the present case, a business brought suit against its landlord 
because the business' inventory had been stolen. While the 
landlord apparently accepted the inescapable fact that it owed a 
duty of protection to the tenant, it argued that the burglary was 
an "intervening cause" which relieved it from liability. In 
rejecting this argument the court explained: 
To succeed with this line of argument, [Landlord] must 
show that the burglary was not "reasonably foreseeable" 
under the circumstances. Prosser analyzes the general 
problem and the specific case of criminal acts as 
follows: 
"If the intervening cause is one which in 
ordinary human experience is reasonably to be 
anticipated, or one which the defendant has 
reason to anticipate under the particular 
circumstances, he may be negligent, among 
other reasons, because he has failed to guard 
against it; or he may be negligent only for 
that reason. 
The same is true as to those intervening 
intentional or criminal acts which the 
defendant might reasonably anticipate, and 
against which he would be required to take 
precautions." [Citation omitted]. 
Id. at 105, emphasis added. 
The trial court suggested that Freeport did not "owe a duty of 
reasonable care to it tenants" because it is a commercial landlord. 
However, this Court has never limited the above-referenced duty of 
reasonable care to non-commercial landlords, but instead used 
extremely broad language in indicating that "this court has charged 
landlords with a duty to exercise reasonable care toward their 
tenants in all circumstances." Williams, supra at 726, emphasis 
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added. It is also important to note that in the above-referenced 
cases from other states, it was never even suggested that 
commercial tenants should be treated differently than non-
commercial tenants. 
Limiting the duty of "reasonable care" to non-commercial 
tenants, as the trial court proposes, not only violates this 
Court's "all circumstances" mandate, but would also violate the 
Utah Constitution's guarantee that "[a]11 laws of a general nature 
shall have uniform operation." (Utah Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 
24). There is no justifiable reason to apply a duty of reasonable 
care to one group of tenants but not to another. Any tenant should 
have the right to equal protection under the law and the trial 
court simply offered no explanation as to why "all circumstances" 
should somehow exclude commercial tenants. 
Furthermore, it is almost universally accepted that if a 
landlord chooses to provide security, his general duty increases. 
For example, in Sharp v. W.H. Moore, Inc., 796 P.2d 506 (Idaho 
1990), the plaintiff sued the property manager of a commercial 
building. As this Court has held, the Idaho Supreme Court held 
that "a landlord is under a duty to exercise reasonable care in 
light of all the circumstances" and that "it is for a jury to 
decide whether that duty was breached." Id., at 509. The court 
then held: 
One who voluntarily assumes a duty also assures the 
obligation of due care in performance of that duty. A 
landlord, having voluntarily provided a security system, 
is potentially subject to liability if the security 
system fails as a result of the landlord1s negligence. 
Jardel Co. v. Hughes, 523 A.2d 518 (Del. 1987) (having 
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provided security, owner must anticipate conduct of third 
persons) [other citations omitted]. 
This Court has ruled likewise. In DCR, Inc. v. Peak Alarm 
Company, 663 P.2d 433 (Utah 1983) this Court explained: 
A majority of jurisdictions, like Utah, have recognized 
a duty to exercise reasonable care on the part of one who 
undertakes to render services. Restatement (Second) of 
Torts formulates this principle as follows: "One who 
undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render 
services to another which he should recognize as 
necessary for the protection of the other!s person or 
things, is subject to liability to the other for physical 
harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable 
care to perform his undertaking if (a) his failure to 
exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or 
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance 
upon the undertaking." 
Id. at 436, emphasis added. There is no question that Freeport 
"undertook to render services." It had (or at least represented it 
had) a surveillance system. It had guards at its gate. It had 
roving security guards to protect the premises. Having undertaken 
the service of providing security, Freeport is "subject to 
liability . . . for physical harm resulting from [its] failure to 
exercise reasonable care to perform [its] undertaking." 
Freeport did have a duty to exercise reasonable care, its 
duties were increased when it actually undertook to render security 
services, and this Court has already specifically ruled in a 
landlord case that "the care to be exercised in any particular case 
depends upon the circumstances of that case and on the extent of 
foreseeable danger involved and must be determined as a question of 
fact.11 For all of these reasons, the trial court erred in holding 
that Freeport does not owe such duties and that, as a matter of 
law, Enerco's negligence claims should be dismissed. 
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Point II. Enerco Should be Covered as a Co-Insured 
Under Freeport*s Insurance Policy 
Enerco feels strongly that the trial court erred in holding 
that Enerco should not have been covered by Freeport's insurance 
policy and that "the GNS Partnership v. Fullmer case cited by 
Enerco is inapplicable to the facts of this case," (R. 1536). As 
set forth above, paragraph 3 of the Lease Agreement clearly 
contemplates that Freeport would maintain insurance protection on 
the warehouse in question because the agreement instructed Enerco 
not to do anything "which would cause an increase in insurance 
premiums, render the insurance thereon void or cause cancellation 
thereof." (Emphasis added). Likewise, paragraph 13(B) of the 
Lease Agreement even specified, to the penny, what the insurance 
premium would be, and required Enerco to contribute additional 
funds if the premium exceeded that amount. (R. 1271). 
These contractual provisions, which leave no question that 
Freeport would have insurance on the building, are critical because 
Utah law has mandated that a tenant is a co-insured under its 
landlord's insurance policy. In GNS Partnership v. Fullmer, 873 
P.2d 1157 (Utah App. 1994), the court referred to the overwhelming 
majority of American cases and explained that "the meijority hold 
the landlord's insurance is presumed to be held for the tenant's 
benefit as a co-insured in the absence of an express agreement to 
the contrary." Id. at 1161, emphasis added. 
The court indicated that "we find the majority view to be more 
persuasive" (id.) and went on to explain that "the landlords, of 
course, could have held out for an agreement that the tsmant would 
22 
furnish . . . insurance on the premises. But they did not. They 
elected to themselves purchase the coverage." Id. 
In this case, Freeport likewise could have "held out for an 
agreement that the tenant would furnish insurance on the premises." 
Not only did it not do so, but it repeatedly indicated in the Lease 
Agreement that .it would do so. Enercofs only obligation was to pay 
any amounts which "exceeded" Freeportfs premium. 
Clearly, making Enerco a co-insured under Freeport!s policy 
will restrict certain rights which Freeportfs insurer would have 
had against Enerco (such as Freeport!s insurer's right to subrogate 
against Enerco). However, no prejudice will occur to Freeport or 
its insurer because paragraph 15(B) of the Lease Agreement itself 
specified that "Landlord and Tenant each further warrant that 
insurance companies insuring Landlord or Tenant shall have no 
rights against the other, whether by assignments, subrogation or 
otherwise." (R. 1272, emphasis added). 
Obviously, if Enerco were not a co-insured, Freeport's 
insurance company would have rights against Enerco, including the 
right to subrogation which exists as to all other non-insureds. 
The fact that the Lease agreement specifically excluded that 
subrogation right is strong evidence of the propriety and 
application in this instance of Utah law holding that "the 
landlord's insurance is presumed to be held for the tenant!s 
benefit as a co-insured in the absence of an express agreement to 
the contrary." 
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The trial court erred in holding, as a matter of law, that 
Enerco was not covered by Freeport's insurance policy and that the 
GNS Partnership case was not applicable to the facts of this case. 
Point III, Freeport Owed Enerco the Duties of a ^ arshousasaan 
The trial court erred in ruling that Freeport "was not acting 
as a warehouseman as contemplated by the UCC" and that Freeport 
"did not owe Enerco the statutory, common law, or contract duties 
of a warehouseman." (R. 1535). Part of the Uniform Commercial 
Code which Utah has statutorily adopted deals specifically with 
warehousers. U.C.A. §70A-7-102 indicates that a "'warehouseman' is 
a person engaged in the business of storing goods for hire." 
(Emphasis added). The "general definitions" section of the title 
indicates that a "'person1 includes an individual or an 
organization." (U.C.A. 70A-1-201(30)). 
The term "goods" is defined as "all things which are treated 
as movable for the purposes of a contract of storage or 
transportation." (U.C.A. 70A-7-102(l)(f)). Enerco's property 
constituted "goods" under the statute and Freeport is a warehouser 
under the statute. 
This designation is important because the statute goes on to 
specifically mandate that: 
A warehouseman is liable for damages for 
loss of or injury to the goods caused by his 
failure to exercise such reasonable care in 
regard to them as a reasonably careful man 
would exercise under like circumstances but 
unless otherwise agreed he is not liable for 
damages which could not have been avoided by 
the exercise of such care. 
U.C.A. 70A-7-204(l), emphasis added. Enerco believes that pursuant 
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to this statute, Freeport has not only a common-law duty to 
exercise reasonable care, but also a statutory duty to do the same. 
Even if this Court rules that Freeport is not bound by the UCC, 
this statute conclusively shows that under Utah law, a tenant which 
has entered into a "lease contract" for purely commercial reasons 
is entitled to a duty of "reasonable care." 
Point IV, Freeport Breached it Contract in This Case 
Although the trial court ruled in favor of Enerco on its claim 
that Freeport breached implied contracts, it erred in ruling that 
"Freeport did not breach any provision of the written Lease. (R. 
1535). Paragraph 15 of the Lease Agreement mandates that !f[i]f 
the demised premises or any part thereof shall be damaged or 
destroyed by fire or other casualty. Landlord shall promptly repair 
all such damage and restore the demised premises without expense to 
Tenant." (R. 1272). Paragraph 29 of the Lease Agreement requires 
that "[t]ime is of the essence of this Lease and every term, 
covenant and condition herein contained." (R. 1277). 
The doors were not repaired, especially in a timely manner, as 
they were kicked in and "left in pieces" for the perpetrators to 
gain access night after night for an extended period of time. Such 
constituted a breach by Freeport of the express provisions of the 
agreement. 
While Enerco believes the above-quoted provisions of the Lease 
are clear regarding the landlord's obligations to provide 
insurance, provide security, and promptly repair damage, at a 
minimum, they create ambiguities which must be construed against 
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Freeport- In addition to the requirement to view all evidence in 
a light most favorable to plaintiff, Utah law requires that in all 
situations, "any ambiguity in a lease shall be construed against 
the lessor." Edwards and Daniels v. Farmers Properties, 865 P.,2d 
1382, 1386, n.5 (Utah App. 1993), emphasis added. This law applies 
not only to lease agreements, but also to any other types of 
contracts: 
The well-established rule in Utah is that any 
uncertainty with respect to construction of a 
contract should be resolved against the party 
who has drawn the agreement. 
Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 1107 (Utah 1982). In this case, 
the written Lease Agreement was drafted entirely by Freeport and 
therefore, the contract must be construed against it. 
Although Enerco believes the above-referenced provisions in 
the Lease Agreement unambiguously imposed obligations on Freeport 
which Freeport did not fulfill, to the extent those provisions 
create ambiguities, those ambiguities also enable this court to 
consider other extrinsic evidence (including the sales brochure, 
the testimony of James Kim, verbal promises made by Freeport 
employees, etc.). This Court has held that "if a contract is 
ambiguous, the court may consider the party!s actions and 
performance as evidence of the partyfs true intention." Platesau 
Min. v. Utah Div. of State Lands, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990). 
See also Interwest Construction v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350, 1359 
(Utah 1996): "Once a contract is found to be ambiguous, a court may 
consider extrinsic evidence to determine its meaning." 
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Not only do ambiguities allow the court to consider extrinsic 
evidence, but they also preclude granting summary judgment as a 
matter of law: 
Only when contract terms are complete, clear, 
and unambiguous can they be interpreted by the 
judge on a motion for summary judgment. 
[Citation omitted.] If the evidence as to the 
terms of an agreement is in conflict, the 
intent of the parties as to the terms of the 
agreement is to be determined by the jury. 
Colonial Leasing Company v. Larsen Brothers Construction, 731 P.2d 
481, 488 (Utah 1986). Even more recently, this Court held: 
A motion for summary judgment may not be 
granted if a legal conclusion is reached that 
an ambiguity exists in the contract and there 
is a factual issue as to what the parties 
intended. 
When ambiguity does exist, the intent of 
the parties is a question of fact to be 
determined by the jury. Failure to resolve an 
ambiguity by determining the parties1 intent 
from parol evidence is error. 
Plateau Mining, supra at 725. 
The Lease Agreement's promises, including that insurance 
protection would be maintained on the warehouse in question and 
that Freeport would promptly repair all damages, create, at a 
minimum, ambiguities as to Freeport!s duties. Those ambiguities 
must be construed against Freeport because it drafted the Lease. 
Those ambiguities also allow consideration of extrinsic evidence 
including Freeport's sale brochures, verbal promises and other 
actions of Freeportfs employees. The trial court erred in granting 
summary judgment on Enerco's breach of contract claim. 
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CONCLUSION 
Summary judgment is only appropriate if there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. All the evidence must be evaluated in a light 
most favorable to Enerco, and any doubt or uncertainty must be 
resolved in its favor. When cases involve negligence, summary 
judgment is appropriate only in the most clear-cut case. 
Utah law mandates that Landlords have duties to exercise 
reasonable care "in all circumstances." This Court has 
unequivocally held that with regard to landlord cases, "the care to 
be exercised in any particular case depends on the circumstances of 
that case and on the extent of foreseeable danger involved, and 
must be determined as a question of fact." It was certainly 
foreseeable that Freeport's failure to provide adequate security 
would allow, if not encourage, exactly what occurred in this case., 
Furthermore, Freeport's general duty in this case was increased by 
the fact that it actually undertook to render security services by 
providing guards at the gate, roving security guards, etc. 
Utah law requires that "the landlord's insurance is presumed 
to be held for the tenant's benefit as a co-insured in the absence 
of an express agreement to the contrary." No such agreement to the 
contrary exists and in fact, the Lease Agreement makes it clear 
that the parties contemplated insurance being in place and that no 
subrogation rights would exist against each other, as is required 
in all co-insured situations. 
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Freeport owed Enerco the duties of a warehouseman, and is 
statutorily liable for the loss of Enerco!s goods. All of the 
actions set forth herein breached the contract between the parties, 
and any ambiguities must be construed against Freeport. 
For all of these reasons, Enerco submits that the trial court 
erred and respectfully requests that the judgment entered in favor 
of Freeport be reversed as set forth herein. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this // ^  day of June, 2001. 
Miohael L. Schwab 
Lloyd A. Hardcastle 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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Michael L. Schwab [A4662] 
Lloyd A. Hardcastle [A5079] 
SCHWAB & HARDCASTLE 
225 South 200 West 
P.O. Box 118 
Farmington, Utah 84025-0118 
Telephone: (801) 451-6560 
Fax: (801) 451-8216 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
FILED 
AUG 1 6 2000 
SECOND 
DISTRICT COURT 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF THE JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
ENERCO, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SOS STAFFING SERVICES, INC., 
FREEPORT CENTER ASSOCIATES, 
et al., 
Defendants. 
FINAL ORDER, JUDGMENT AND STAY 
Civil No.: 970700262 CN 
Judge Rodney S. Page 
This Court signed a "Ruling on Defendant Freeport Center's 
Motion for Summary Judgment" on or about January 11, 2000. 
Thereafter, defendant Freeport Center ("Freeport") submitted a 
proposed "Order and Judgment Regarding Freeport Center's Motion for 
Summary Judgment." 
After receiving the proposed Order, plaintiff ("Enerco") filed 
a Notice of Objection, which made certain objections to Freeportfs 
proposed Order and which requested that the Order signed by the 
Court be certified as a final order and judgment pursuant to Rule 
54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
A hearing on plaintiff's Notice of Objection was held before 
K 
this Court on July 18, 2000, at which time the Court heard oral 
argument from both counsel of record. Having heard that argument, 
reviewed the relevant pleadings, and good cause appearing 
therefore, the Court makes the findings and conclusions set forth 
herein and hereby DECREES, ADJUDGES, and ENTERS A FINAL ORDER AND 
JUDGMENT as follows: 
1. Freeport is not in the business of storing goods for hire* 
and with respect to Enerco's goods, was not acting as a 
warehouseman as contemplated by the UCC. Therefore, Freeport did 
not owe Enerco the statutory, common law or contract duties of at 
warehouseman. Summary judgment is granted to Freeport as to any 
claims based on the duties of a warehouseman. 
2. The lease agreement between the parties did not create ct 
lease subject to the terms of the UCC. Specifically, U.C.A. 70A-
2a-101, et. seq., including 70A-2a-218 and 219, do not apply in 
this case. Summary judgment is granted to Freeport as to any of 
Enercofs claims based on the UCC. 
3. The written lease agreement between Enerco and Freeport 
is valid and enforceable. That agreement does not require Freeport 
to provide security for Enerco!s goods and it does not require 
Freeport to provide theft insurance for the benefit of Enerco. 
Freeport did not breach any provision of the written lease. 
Specifically, it did not breach the lease by failing to repair a 
door as alleged by Enerco, because there was no written notice 
given by Enerco concerning the door. Summary judgment is granted 
to Freeport and against Enerco as to any of Enerco! s claims for 
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breach of the written lease agreement. 
4. Under Utah law, Freeport did not have a duty to obtain or 
maintain insurance which would cover Enerco for any loss caused by 
theft. It had no contractual or common-law duty to provide that 
insurance to Enerco. The GNS Partnership v. Fullmer case cited by 
Enerco is inapplicable to the facts of this case. Summary judgment 
is granted to Freeport and against Enerco as to claims that Enerco 
should have been covered by or added to Freeport!s insurance 
policy. 
5. As a commercial landlord, Freeport does not owe a duty of 
reasonable care to its tenants to protect against loss of or damage 
to property. Freeport had no duty to protect its tenant's property 
from theft by third persons, except as may arise by agreement of 
the parties. Summary judgment is granted to Freeport and against 
Enerco as to all of Enerco1s claims based on negligence. 
6. As to Enerco's claims that the parties entered into 
implied agreements whereby Freeport would provide security for 
Enercofs property, the Court finds that there are contested issues 
of fact. Summary judgment is therefore denied as to Enerco!s claim 
for breach of implied contracts. 
7. Regarding this Order and Judgment, specifically all 
matters on which summary judgment has been granted above, the Court 
hereby makes an express direction for the entry of final judgment, 
further makes the express determination that there is no just 
reason for delay of its entry, and certifies this Order and 
Judgment as final for appeal. 
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8. Pursuant to Enercofs request under Rule 62, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, the Court hereby stays enforcement of the judgment 
and other proceedings before this Court so that Enerco may pursue 
an appeal, This stay shall not prohibit counsel from voluntarily 
agreeing between themselves to conduct additional investigation, or 
seeking assistance from the Court which either deems is 
appropriate. 
DATED this \5 day of HlAQa<A" , 2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
DARWIN C. HANSEN 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
Honorable Rodney S. Page 
Second District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of August, 2000, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to be 
mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
John R. Lund, Esq. 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Theodore R. Weckel 
MATTHEW HILTON, P.C. 
1220 North Main Street, #5A 
P.O. Box 781 
Springville, UT 84663 
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APPENDIX "B" 
7 R E E P 0 R T C E N T E R A S S O C I A T E S 
CLEARFIELD, UTAH 
L E A S E 
This Lease made and entered into this 9th day of 
July 19 93 . by and between FREEPORT CENTER ASSOCIATES, 
hereinafter called "Landlord", and ENERCO INC. , 
hereinafter called "Tenant." 
W I T N E S S E T H : 
In consideration of the covenants and agreements of the 
respective parties herein contained, the parties hereto do hereby 
agree as follows: 
DEMISED PREMISES 
Landlord hereby leases to Tenant, and Tenant hires from 
Landlord the premises described on Exhibit "A" annexed hereto as a 
part hereof, together with the improvements thereon (hereinafter 
referred to as the "demised premises" or "premises") for the term 
and upon the rental and the covenants and agreements of the 
respective parties herein set forth. Said premises are located in 
the City of Clearfield, County of Davis, State of Utah. 
TERM 
The term of this Lease shall be six Months 
beginning on the 1st day of August 19 93 , and ending on 
the 31st day of January 19 94 . both dates inclusive, 
unless sooner terminated as herein provided. 
TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF LEASE 
This Lease is made on the following terms and conditions 
which are expressly covenanted and agreed to by Landlord and 
Tenant: 
1. RENT: Tenant agrees to pay as rental to Landlord at 
the office of Landlord, Clearfield, Utah, or at such other place as 
Landlord may from time to time designate in writing, without any 
offset or deduction whatsoever, the total sum of Twelve 
Thousand Four Hundred Eighty and No/100 Dollars ($ 12,480.00 ) 
over the term of this Lease in lawful money of the United States in 
monthly installments of Two Thousand Eighty and No7100 
Dollars fS2.080.00 ) due and payable on the first day of each month 
(the "rent"). Any other amounts or expenses payable by Tenant to 
Landlord under this Lease, including amounts payable under 
Paragraphs 13 and 24, shall be payable upon the rendition of the 
Landlord's Statement therefor. If Tenant shall fail to pay the 
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rent within five (5) days after the first day of the month, or 
shall fail to pay any other amounts payable by Tenant pursuant to 
the provisions of this Lease within ten (10) days after the 
rendition of the Landlord1s Statement. Tenant shall pay Landlord 
interest thereon at the rate of 18% per annum, which interest shall 
run from either (a) the day when the Rent was due, (b) the date 
Landlord's Statement for certain increases under Paragraph 13 is 
sent to Tenant, or (c) for any other amounts or expenses payable by 
Tenant, the date of Landlord's expenditures. Notwithstanding the 
foregoing, Landlord shall have all legal remedies available for the 
enforcement of the payment of rent and other expenses of Tenant 
hereunder, including the power to evict for nonpayment of rent or 
other expenses of tenant as provided in Paragraph 24. 
2. AUTHORIZED USE: Tenant shall use the premises for 
the following purpose and for no other purpose whatsoever, without 
the written consent of the Landlord first had and obtained: 
Storage and distribution of Tenant's products 
and materials. 
Tenant represents and covenants that it will not produce, 
store or use any hazardous or toxic waste or substance, PCB, dioxin 
or asbestos on the premises. 
3. INCREASING INSURANCE RISK: Tenant will not permit 
the demised premises to be used for any purpose, other than those 
noted in Paragraph 2, which would cause an increase in insurance 
premiums, render the insurance thereon void or cause cancellation 
thereof. In the event the insurance is cancelled because of a 
change in Tenant's use of the premises, Tenant will be liable for 
any loss or damage to the building occurring before reinstatement 
or replacement of that insurance. 
4. CONDITION OP THE PREMISES: Tenant has inspected the 
demised premises including all equipment which is a part thereof 
and accepts the premises in the condition they are in at the time 
of the commencement of the term of this Lease without any represen-
tation express or implied on the part of Landlord or its agents as 
to the condition of the premises, or suitability of the premises 
for Tenant's use. 
5. COMPLIANCE WITH GOVERNMENTAL REQUIREMENTS: Tenant 
shall, at Tenant's own expense, comply with all laws, ordinances, 
regulations or orders of any federal, state, county, municipal or 
other public authority affecting the Tenant's use of the premises 
promptly correcting any non-compliance upon discovery thereof and 
Landlord hereby consents to any action reasonably taken by Tenant 
to correct such non-compliance. Tenant will not commit any waste 
on the premises nor permit any obnoxious odors or noise to emanate 
from the premises, nor shall it knowingly use or permit the use of 
the premises in violation of any present or future law, rule or 
regulation of the United States or of the State of Utah, or in 
violation of any county or municipal ordinance or regulation 
applicable thereto. 
6. CARE OP BUILDING BY TENANT: Tenant agrees to keep 
the interior of the building and the improvements on the premises 
inside and outside the building and the grounds in good condition 
and repair including proper servicing and maintenance of all 
equipment. The equipment and fixtures to be maintained include 
without limitation, lighting fixtures, heating and air conditioning 
equipment, truck dock bumpers, overhead freight doors (including 
all repairs thereto) and electrical wiring and plumbing systems. 
Tenant agrees to contract with a qualified heating and air 
conditioning service company for periodic maintenance and service 
of HVAC equipment. Such service to be at a minimum twice per year. 
Such work by Tenant also includes cleaning and painting the 
interior of the premises as Tenant deems necessary in order to 
maintain said premises in a clean, attractive and sanitary 
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condition. Tenant shall keep the vehicular parking areas, 
pedestrian walkways, entranceways and docks reasonably free from 
icicles, ice and snow and shall keep the grounds surrounding the 
demised premises clean, promptly removing therefrom all trash, 
rubbish, cartons or other debris. If the Tenant fails to do any of 
the foregoing as herein required Landlord may elect to proceed 
under one or more of its remedies as set forth in Paragraph 24 of 
this Lease. 
7. REPAIR OF BUILDING BY LANDLORD: Landlord agrees for 
the term of this Lease to maintain in good condition, subject to 
such conditions as Tenant has accepted at the time of taking 
possession, the components of the demised premises, unless said 
walls, floor, foundation, roof or other structural components are 
damaged as a result of Tenant's, or its employees and agents, 
actions or breach of the provisions of this Lease. Landlord shall 
not, however, be obligated to make any such repairs until written 
notice of the need of repair shall have been given to the Landlord 
by the Tenant and after such notice is so given, the Landlord shall 
have a reasonable time in which to make such repairs. Landlord 
shall not be liable for any resulting damage to the contents unless 
it fails to diligently proceed to correct such defect after receipt 
of written notice. 
8. INSTALLATION, ALTERATIONS AND REMOVALS: It is 
expressly agreed and understood that the Tenant will make no 
alterations, additions or betterments to, or installations 
("alterations") upon the leased premises without the prior written 
approval of the Landlord which approval shall not be unreasonably 
withheld. Such alterations, if approved, shall be made at Tenant's 
expense. All such alterations shall become a part of the premises 
and may not be removed by Tenant at termination of this Lease 
unless Landlord gives written notice to Tenant to remove all or 
some part of such alterations, in which event Tenant shall remove 
such alterations upon termination. 
9. ERECTION AND REMOVAL OP SIGNS: Subject to the 
restrictions of this Paragraph, Tenant may place suitable signs on 
the leased premises for the purpose of indicating the nature of the 
business carried on by the Tenant in said premises. Such signs 
shall be approved by the Landlord in writing prior to their 
erection, which approval shall not be unreasonably withheld, and 
shall not damage the leased premises in any manner. Tenant shall 
remove all signs prior to the expiration of the term. 
10. GLASS: Tenant agrees to immediately replace all 
glass broken or damaged during the term of this Lease with glass of 
the same quality as that broken or damaged. 
11. RIGHT OF ENTRY BY LANDLORD: The Tenant at any time 
during the term of this Lease shall permit inspection including 
environmental sampling or testing of the demised premises during 
reasonable business hours by the Landlord's agents or representa-
tives for the purpose of ascertaining the condition of the demised 
premises and compliance with governmental laws and regulations, and 
in order that the Landlord may make such repairs as may be required 
to be made by the Landlord under the terms of this Lease. Sixty 
(60) days prior to the expiration of this Lease, Landlord may post 
suitable notices on the demised premises that the same are "To Let" 
and may show the premises to prospective tenants at reasonable 
times. Landlord shall not, however, thereby unnecessarily 
interfere with the use of demised premises by the Tenant. 
12. PAYMENT OP UTILITIES: Tenant shall pay all charges 
for water, sewer, heat, gas, electricity, telephone and other 
public utilities used on the premises. 
13. PAYMENT OP CERTAIN INCREASES IN PROPERTY TAXES AND 
INSURANCE: 
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A. Tenant shall further pay to Landlord any amount by 
which the real property taxes on the premises ( Building E-13 
Section 4-A - 16,000 so. ft. ), and any expenses incurred by 
Landlord to reduce property taxes allocable to the premises, for 
any year during the term of 1Ais Lease commencing with the calendar 
year 1993 exceed those for 1992 (the "base year11) . 
Taxes for the base year on the premises (land and improvements, 
which is proportionately allocated among the several premises 
contained within each tax parcel) are calculated as follows: 
.704 Acres X S13.019.72 « $ 9,165.88 
Demised Premises Fair Market Value « 34,660.00 
$ 43,825.88 
1992 Tax Rate « .016836 
Base Year Taxes Due on Demised Premises - $ 737.85 
The same method of calculation shall be used for each 
subsequent year, including adjustments for alterations and new 
improvements made to the premises. 
Landlord will provide Tenant each year with a complete 
computation of the taxes for the demised premises and within thirty 
(30) days thereafter Tenant will pay Landlord the increase in taxes 
over the base year taxes. 
Real property taxes include all assessments and other 
governmental levies, ordinary and extraordinary, foreseen and 
unforeseen, which are assessed or imposed upon the premises or 
become payable during the term of this Lease. 
B. Tenant shall also pay to Landlord any amount by which 
the property insurance premiums allocable to the demised premises 
for any year during the term of this Lease exceed the annual 
premium of S 135.28 presently paid by Landlord for the demised 
premises prior to Tenant*s occupancy. In determining whether 
increased premiums are allocable to the demised premises, any 
schedules or rating procedures, as well as general rate increases, 
as determined by the organization issuing the insurance shall be 
conclusive evidence of the several items and charges which make up 
the insurance rates and premiums on the demised premises. Landlord 
will provide Tenant with a complete computation of any premium 
increase on the demised premises and within thirty (30) days 
thereafter Tenant will pay Landlord the insurance premium increase 
as set forth in the computation. 
C. If this Lease is terminated at other than the end of 
a calendar year, all amounts payable by Tenant to Landlord under 
the provisions of this Paragraph 13 shall be prorated on the basis 
of a 360-day year, 30 days allocated to each month. 
14. ASSIGNMENT AND SUBLETTING: Tenant shall not 
transfer or assign this Lease or any interest therein nor sublet or 
otherwise make available ("transfer") to any third party any part 
of the demised premises without first notifying Landlord in writing 
and receiving the written consent of Landlord to such transfer! 
The written notice to Landlord shall describe the area to be 
transferred and the rent and other consideration receivable for 
such transfer. A transfer by Tenant without the written consent of 
Landlord first received shall permit Landlord to terminate this 
Lease pursuant to Paragraph 24. 
No transfer consented to by Landlord shall relieve Tenant 
of its obligations hereunder, and Tenant shall continue to be 
liable as principal as though no transfer had been made. It is 
agreed that a transfer by corporate merger or to an affiliated 
corporation shall not be subject to the provisions of this 
Paragraph 14 so long as the transferee has a net worth equal to or 
in excess of the net worth of Tenant. *—jj? 
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15. DAMAGE OR DESTRUCTION: 
A. If the demised premises or any part thereof shall be 
damaged or destroyed by fire or other casualty, Landlord shall 
promptly repair all such damage and restore the demised premises 
without expense to Tenant, subject to delays due to adjustment of 
insurance claims, strikes and other causes beyond Landlord's 
control. If such damage or destruction shall render the premises 
untenable in whole or in part, the rent shall be abated wholly or 
proportionately as the case may be until the damage shall be 
repaired and the premises restored. If the damage or destruction 
shall be so extensive as to require the substantial rebuilding 
(i.e., expenditure of twenty-five (25%) percent or more of 
replacement costs) of any one building included in the demised 
premises, either party may elect to terminate this Lease by written 
notice to the other within thirty (30) days after the occurrence of 
such damage or destruction. 
B. Tenant and Landlord hereby mutually release and waive 
their entire right of recovery against the other party for any and 
all loss or damage to the improvements, all personal property of 
Tenant, and any installations, betterments or improvements added to 
the building by Tenant, where such loss is occasioned, caused or 
incurred by, or results from fire windstorm, hail, explosion, riot 
attending strike, civil commotion, aircraft, vehicles, smoke and 
vandalism and all other perils which are insurable against, whether 
said loss occurred or was caused by the negligence of the Tenant or 
Landlord, their agents, servants, employees, sublessees or 
concessionaires, or otherwise. Landlord and Tenant each further 
warrant that insurance companies insuring Landlord or Tenant shall 
have no rights against the other, whether by assignments, subroga-
tion or otherwise. Willful misconduct of a criminal nature 
lawfully attributable to either party shall to the extent that said 
conduct contributes to loss or damage not be excused under this 
Paragraph. 
16. AUTOMATIC SPRINKLER SYSTEM: Landlord agrees to 
maintain the Automatic Sprinkler System to conform with the 
requirements of the Utah Fire Rating Bureau for grading the 
building as an Automatic Sprinklered Building. Tenant agrees to 
repair any damage to this system arising out of its occupancy, and 
to hold Landlord free and harmless from damage to or destruction of 
any and all property resulting from leakage of said Automatic 
Sprinkler System, during the term of this Lease or any extension 
thereof, or any holdover occupancy. 
17. OVERHEAD CRANES: Delete 
18. INDEMNIFICATIONS: Tenant shall pay and shall 
indemnify and hold Landlord and its principals, employees and 
agents harmless from and against any and all liabilities, fines, 
losses, damages, costs (including attorney's fees and expenses) 
causes of action, claims or judgments of any nature whatsoever, 
unless due to the negligence or willful misconduct of landlord or 
its principals, employees or agents, in connection with any and all 
of the following: 
(a) any injury to, or the death of, any person on 
the premises or upon adjoining streets or walks, or in any way 
related to Tenant's use or occupancy of the premises; 
(b) any theft of or damage to or destruction of 
goods, wares, merchandise and all other property of Tenant or 
others located on the premises or arising from Tenant's use of 
the premises; 
(c) any negligent, careless or willful act of 
Tenant or any of its agents, contractors, servants, employees, 
assigns or subtenants, licensees or invitees, if any; 
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(d) any violation by Tenant of any covenant, 
restriction, agreement or condition of this Lease; violation 
by Tenant of any contract or agreement to which Tenant is a 
party relating to Tenant's use of the premises, or violation 
by Tenant of any restriction, law, ordinance or regulation 
affecting the premises or any part thereof including the 
occupancy or use thereof. 
Each of these indemnifications shall survive the expiration or 
termination of this Lease. 
19. INSURANCE: Tenant agrees to carry adequate 
Workmen^ Compensation Insurance to comply with the legal require-
ments of the State of Utah. Tenant agrees to carry adequate or 
appropriate Commercial General Liability insurance insuring against 
all liability exposure to third parties arising out of Tenant's 
operations or use of the premises, in a company or companies 
authorized to issue insurance in Utah, and to furnish to the 
Landlord Certificates of such insurance which include a thirty (30) 
day notice to the Landlord prior to any cancellation or reduction 
thereof by the company or companies. 
20. SURRENDER 07 PREMISES: Tenant agrees to surrender 
up the demised premises at the expiration, or sooner termination of 
this Lease, or any extension thereof, in the same condition, as 
when said premises were delivered to the Tenant, or as altered, 
pursuant to the provisions of this Lease, ordinary wear, tear and 
damage by the elements excepted. Tenant shall also remove all of 
its personal property from the demised premises not later than the 
time of termination. Tenant specifically covenants that upon 
termination the premises will be free of any hazardous waste 
material and that Tenant will be responsible for returning the 
premises to a condition meeting all requirements as may at such 
time or thereafter as may be imposed by governmental agencies 
regulating the handling of hazardous waste materials. 
21. HOLDOVER: Should Tenant holdover the demised 
premises or any part thereof after the expiration of the term of 
this Lease, unless otherwise agreed in writing, such holding over 
shall constitute a tenancy from month-to-month only, and Tenant 
shall pay a sum equal to one and one-half (1-1/2) times the monthly 
rental provided herein, payable monthly in advance, but otherwise 
on the same terms and conditions as herein provided, except as to 
any provisions hereof relating to renewals of extensions. 
22. QUIET ENJOYMENT: If and so long as the Tenant pays 
the rents reserved by this Lease and performs and observes all the 
covenants and provisions hereof the Landlord will, throughout the 
term of this Lease, warrant and defend the Tenant in the enjoyment 
and peaceful possession of the demised premises against all parties 
claiming a title to the premises superior to Landlord^ and against 
all parties claiming by through or under Landlord. 
23. WAIVER OP COVENANTS: It is agreed that the waiving 
of any of the covenants of this Lease by either party shall be 
limited to the particular instance and shall not be deemed to waive 
any other breaches of such covenant or any provision herein 
contained; nor shall waiver of any breach by another tenant be 
deemed to waive any breach by Tenant. 
24. DEFAULT PROVISIONS: 
A. The following events shall be considered events of 
default by Tenant: 
(i) If default shall be made in the due and 
punctual payment of any rent or other sums payable under this 
Lease or any part thereof, when and as the same shall become 
due and payable, and such default shall continue for a period 
of ten (10) business days; or <— j^-
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(ii) If default shall be made by Tenant in the 
performance of or compliance with any of the covenants, 
agreements, terms or provisions contained in this Lease, and 
such default shall continue for a period of thirty (30) days 
after written notice thereof from Landlord to Tenant, except 
that in connection with a default not susceptible of being 
cured with due diligence within thirty days, the time within 
which Tenant shall cure the same shall be extended for such 
time as may be necessary to cure the same with all due 
diligence, provided Tenant commences within 7 days of the date 
of receipt of such notice to cure the same and proceeds 
diligently to affect such cure and further provided that such 
period of time shall not be so extended as to subject Landlord 
to any criminal liability; or 
(iii) If the leased premises or any part thereof 
shall be abandoned or vacated or if Tenant shall be dispos-
sessed therefrom by or under any authority other than Land-
lord. 
B. Upon the occurrence of any such events of default, 
mdlord shall have the right to pursue any one or more of the 
allowing remedies: 
(i) Make performance for Tenant of any covenant 
or condition which Tenant is in default of and for the purpose 
advance such amounts as may be necessary. Any amounts so 
advanced or any expense incurred by Landlord by reason of the 
failure of Tenant to comply with any covenant, agreement, 
obligation or provision of this Lease or in defending any 
action to which Landlord may be subjected by reason of any 
such failure shall be due and payable to Landlord on demand, 
and interest shall accrue thereon from the date of expenditure 
at the rate of 18% per annum. 
(ii) Terminate this Lease and end the term hereof 
by giving to Tenant written notice of such termination, in 
which event Landlord shall be entitled to recover from Tenant 
the amount of rent reserved in this Lease for the then balance 
of the term hereof; or 
(iii) Without retaking possession of the premises 
or terminating this Lease, to sue monthly for and recover all 
rents, other required payments due under this Lease, and other 
sums, including damages and legal fees, at any time and from 
time to time accruing hereunder; or 
(iv) Upon notice to all interested parties, re-
enter and take possession of the premises or any part thereof 
and repossess the same as of Landlord's former estate and 
expel Tenant and those claiming through or under Tenant and 
remove the effects of both or either (forcibly, if necessary) 
without being deemed guilty in any manner of trespass and 
without prejudice to any remedies for arrears of rent. 
Landlord may relet the premises or any part thereof for such 
term or terms and at such rental or rentals and upon such 
other terms and conditions as Landlord may deem advisable 
with the right to make alterations and repairs to the premis-
es. Such re-entry or taking of possession of the premises by 
Landlord shall not be construed as an election on Landlord's 
part to terminate this Lease unless, a written notice of 
termination be given to Tenant or unless the termination 
thereof be decreed by a court of competent jurisdiction. In 
the event of Landlord's election to proceed under this 
subparagraph, then such repossession shall not relieve Tenant 
of its obligations and liabilities under this Lease, all of 
which shall survive such repossession, and Tenant shall pay to 
Landlord as current liquidated damages, the rent and other 
sums hereinabove provided which would be payable hereunder if 
such repossession had not occurred, less the net proceeds (if 
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any) of reletting of the premises after deducting all of the 
Landlord's expenses in connection with such reletting, 
including but without limitation all repossession costs, 
brokerage commissions, legal expenses, attorneys' fees, 
expenses of employees, alteration costs and expenses of 
preparation for such reletting. Such reletting may be in the 
name of Landlord or otherwise, for such term or terms (which 
may be greater or less than the period which would otherwise 
have constituted the balance of the term of this Lease) and on 
such conditions (which may include concessions or free rent) 
as Landlord, in its uncontrolled discretion, may determine and 
may collect and receive the rents therefor. Landlord shall 
make a reasonable effort to relet the premises to acceptable 
tenants, but Landlord shall in no way be responsible or liable 
for any failure to relet the demised premises or any part 
thereof or for any failure to collect any rent or other 
charges due upon such reletting. Tenant shall pay such 
current damages to Landlord on the days on which the rent 
would have been payable hereunder if possession had not been 
retaken and Landlord shall be entitled to receive the same 
from Tenant on such day. 
Use of any of the foregoing remedies shall not preclude 
pursuit of any of the other remedies provided for herein. Failure 
by Landlord to enforce one or more of the remedies herein provided 
upon an event of default shall not be deemed or construed to 
constitute a waiver of such default, or of any other violation or 
breach of any of the terms, provisions and covenants herein 
contained. 
25. BANKRUPTCY OR INSOLVENCY: 
A. In the event that Tenant shall become a debtor under 
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code and Tenant's trustee or Tenant 
shall elect to assume this Lease for the purpose of assigning the 
same or otherwise, such election and assignment may be made only if 
the provisions of Paragraphs 26.B. and 26.D. are satisfied. If 
Tenant or Tenant's trustee shall fail to elect to assume this Lease 
within 60 days after the filing of such petition or such additional 
time as provided by the court within such 60-day period, this Lease 
shall be deemed to have been rejected. Immediately thereupon 
Landlord shall be entitled to possession of the Premises without 
further obligation to Tenant or Tenant's trustee and this Lease 
shall terminate, but Landlord's right to be compensated for damages 
in any such proceeding shall survive. 
B. In the event that a petition for reorganization or 
adjustment of debts is filed concerning Tenant under Chapter 11 of 
the Bankruptcy Code, or a proceeding is filed under Chapter 7 of 
the Bankruptcy Code and is transferred to Chapter 11, Tenant's 
trustee or Tenant, as debtor-in-possession, must elect to assume 
this Lease within 120 days from the date of the filing of the 
petition under Chapter 11 or Tenant's trustee or the debtor-in-
possession has failed to perform all of Tenant's obligations under 
this Lease within the time periods (excluding grace periods) 
required for such performance, no election by Tenant's trustee or 
the debtor-in-possession to assume this Lease, whether under 
Chapter 7 or Chapter 11, shall be effective unless each of the 
following conditions has been satisfied: 
(1) Tenant's trustee or the debtor-in-possession 
has cured all defaults under the Lease, or has provided 
Landlord with Assurance (as defined below) that it will cure, 
(i) all defaults susceptible of being cured by the payment of 
money within 10 days from the date of such assumption and that 
it will cure all other defaults under this Lease which are 
susceptible of being cured by the performance of any act 
promptly after the date of such assumption. 
(2) Tenant's trustee or the debtor-in-possession 
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has compensated, or has provided Landlord with Assurance that 
within 10 days from the date of such assumption it will 
compensate Landlord for any actual pecuniary loss incurred by 
Landlord arising from the default of Tenant, Tenant1 s trustee, 
or the debtor-in-possession indicated in any statement of 
actual pecuniary loss sent by Landlord to Tenants trustee or 
the debtor-in-possession. 
(3) Tenant's trustee or the debtor-in-possession 
has provided Landlord with Assurance of the future performance 
of each of the obligations under this Lease of Tenant, 
Tenant's trustee or the debtor-in-possession, and if Tenant's 
trustee or the debtor-in-possession has provided such Assur-
ance Tenant's trustee or the debtor-in-possession shall also 
(i) deposit with Landlord, as security for the timely payment 
of rent hereunder, an amount equal to three (3) monthly 
installments of rent which shall be applied to installments of 
rent in the inverse order in which such installments shall 
become due provided all the terms and provisions of this Lease 
shall have been complied with, and (ii) pay in advance to 
Landlord on the date rent is due and payable one-twelfth of 
Tenant's other annual obligations pursuant to this Lease. The 
obligations imposed upon Tenant's trustee or the debtor-in-
possession by this Paragraph shall continue with respect to 
Tenant or any assignee of this Lease after the completion of 
bankruptcy proceedings. 
For purposes of this Paragraph 25, Landlord and Tenant acknowledge 
that "Assurance" shall mean no less than: Tenant's trustee or the 
debtor-in-possession has and will continue to have sufficient 
unencumbered assets after the payment of all secured obligations 
and administrative expenses to assure Landlord that sufficient 
funds will be available to fulfill the obligations of Tenant under 
this Lease and there shall have been deposited with Landlord 
sufficient cash to secure to Landlord the obligation of Tenant to 
cure the defaults under this Lease, monetary and/or non-monetary 
within the time periods set forth above. 
C. In the event that this Lease is assumed in accordance 
with Paragraph 25(B) and thereafter Tenant is liquidated or files 
a subsequent petition for reorganization or adjustment of debts 
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, Landlord may, at its 
option, terminate this Lease and all rights of Tenant hereunder, by 
giving Tenant notice of its election to so terminate within 30 days 
after the occurrence of either of such events. 
D. If Tenant's trustee or the debtor-in-possession has 
assumed the Lease pursuant to the terms and provisions of Para-
graphs 25(A) or 25(B) for the purpose of assigning (or elects to 
assign) this Lease, this Lease may be so assigned only if the 
proposed assignee has provided adequate assurance of future 
performance of all of the terms, covenants and conditions of this 
Lease to be performed by Tenant. Landlord shall be entitled to 
receive all cash proceeds of such assignment. As used herein 
"adequate assurance of future performance" shall mean that no less 
than each of the following conditions has been satisfied: 
(1) The proposed assignee has furnished Landlord 
with either (i) a current financial statement audited by a 
certified public accountant indicating a net worth and working 
capital in amounts which Landlord reasonably determines to be 
sufficient to assure the future performance by such assignee 
of Tenant's obligations under this Lease or (ii) a guarantee 
or guarantees, in form and substance satisfactory to Lessor, 
from one or more persons with a net worth satisfactory to 
Landlord. 
(2) The proposed assignment will not release or 
impair any guaranty of the obligations of Tenant (including 
the proposed assignee) under this Lease, 
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E. When, pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code, Tenants 
trustee or the debtor-in-possession shall be obliged to pay 
reasonable use and occupancy charges for the use of the premises, 
such charges shall not be less than the Fixed Rent and Additional 
Rent payable by Tenant under this Lease. 
F. Neither the whole nor any portion of Tenant's 
interest in this Lease or its estate in the premises shall pass to 
any trustee, receiver, assignee for the benefit of creditors, 
or any other person or entity, or otherwise by operation of law 
unless Landlord shall have consented to such transfer in writing. 
No acceptance by Landlord of rent or any other payments from any 
such trustee, receiver, assignee, person or other entity shall be 
deemed to constitute such consent by Landlord nor shall it be 
deemed a waiver of Landlord's right to terminate this Lease for any 
transfer of Tenant's interest under this Lease without such 
consent. 
26. ATTORNEYS FEES: In the event either party shall 
enforce the terms of this Lease by suit or otherwise, the party at 
fault shall pay the costs and expenses incident thereto, including 
reasonable attorney's fees. 
27. FAILURE TO PERFORM COVENANT: Except for Tenant's 
obligation to pay rent and to pay other monies including mainten-
ance of insurance, any failure on the part of either party to 
perform any obligation hereunder, and any delay in doing any act 
required hereby shall be excused if such failure or delay is caused 
by any strike, lockout or governmental restriction to the extent 
and for the period that such continues. 
28. RIGHTS OF SUCCESSORS AND ASSIGNS: The covenants and 
agreements contained in this Lease shall apply to, inure to the 
benefit of, and be binding upon the parties hereto and upon their 
respective successors in interest and legal representatives. 
29. TIKE: Time is of the essence of this Lease and 
every term, covenant and condition herein contained. 
30. LIENS: Tenant agrees not to permit any lien for 
monies owing by Tenant to remain against the premises for a period 
of more than thirty (30) days following discovery of the same by 
Tenant; provided, however, that nothing herein contained shall 
prevent Tenant, in good faith and for good cause, from contesting 
in the courts the claim or claims of any person, firm or corpora-
tion growing out of Tenant's operation of the demised premises or 
costs of improvements by Tenant on the said premises, and the 
postponement of payment of such claim or claims, until such contest 
shall finally be decided by the courts shall not be a violation of 
this Lease or any covenant hereof. Should any such lien be filed 
and not released or discharged or action not commenced to declare 
the same invalid within thirty (30) days after discovery of same by 
Tenant, Landlord may at Landlord's option (but without any 
obligation so to do) pay or discharge such lien and may likewise 
pay and discharge any taxes, assessments or other charges against 
the premises which Tenant is obligated hereunder to pay and which 
may or might become a lien on said premises. Tenant agrees to 
repay any sums so paid by the Landlord upon demand therefor, 
together with interest at the rate of eighteen (18%) percent per 
annum from the date any such payment is made. 
31. LIMITATION OF LANDLORD'S LIABILITY: The obligations 
of Landlord under this Lease do not constitute personal obligations 
of the individual partners of Landlord and Tenant shall look solely 
to the real estate that is the subject of this Lease and to no 
other assets of the Landlord for satisfaction of any liability in 
respect of this Lease and will not seek recourse against the 
individual partners of Landlord or any of their personal assets for 
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such satisfaction. 
J*., EMINENT DOMAIN: In the event any power of eminent 
domain shall ever be used by any government authority, federal, 
state, county or municipal, or by any other party vested by law 
with such power, for the taking of the premises or any substantial 
portion thereof, and if such taking shall prevent the full use and 
enjoyment of the premises by Tenant for the purposes set forth 
herein, Tenant shall have the right thereupon to terminate this 
Lease by giving written notice to Landlord. 
In the event of the taking of a substantial portion less 
than the whole of the premises, Tenant may elect, in lieu of 
exercising its right of termination, to continue in possession, 
under the terms of this Lease, of the portion of the premises not 
so taken, and the rent hereunder shall be abated by such proportion 
as the number of square feet of the building floor space taken 
bears to the total number of square feet of building floor space 
included in the premises. In such event, if any portion of any 
building or buildings comprising the premises shall have been 
taken, Landlord shall restore such building or buildings by 
repairing and enclosing the same to the extent necessary and 
possible to provide an integral and complete building suitable for 
the purposes set forth in Paragraph 2 hereof, giving effect to the 
reduced size of the premises. 
Any award or compensation for damages, whether resulting 
by judgement or verdict after trial or by agreement under threat of 
condemnation, applying to the leasehold interest created hereby, 
shall be paid to Landlord, and Tenant hereby authorizes Landlord as 
attorney-in-fact of Tenant to enter into any agreement or compro-
mise, execute any instrument of transfer or assignment or other-
wise, and do any other acts in connection with such leasehold 
interest and such eminent domain proceedings as Landlord, in its 
discretion, shall determine; provided, however, Landlord shall hold 
the proceeds of any such compensation, award or settlement (other 
than severance damages which may be awarded to Landlord by reason 
of the severance of the premises or a portion thereof from other 
lands owned by Landlord) in trust for the benefit of Landlord, 
Tenant and any mortgagee as their interests may appear. 
When Tenant claims an interest in any such proceeds, 
Tenant's leasehold interest for purposes of measuring Tenant's 
interest in such proceeds shall be deemed limited to the remainder 
of the term of this Lease then in effect, and no future right of 
extension or renewal at Tenant's option shall be construed to 
enlarge Tenant's leasehold interest for such purposes. 
33. SUBORDINATION OF LEASE TO MORTGAGES ON THE DEMISED 
PREMISES: This Lease shall be subject and subordinate to any 
mortgage (or trust deed) now existing or hereafter placed on the 
demised premises given to secure a loan made by a lender to 
Landlord, and to any renewals, replacements, extensions or 
consolidations thereof, which shall contain a provision that, so 
long as Tenant shall not be in default in the performance of its 
obligations under this Lease in such manner and after such notice 
as would entitle Landlord to terminate this Lease, the holder of 
such mortgage shall not disturb the possession of Tenant or 
terminate this Lease. 
34. REPRESENTATIONS: Tenant acknowledges that the 
Landlord has made no agreement or promise concerning the alter-
ation, improvement, adaptation or repair of any part of the 
premises which has not been set forth herein, and that this Lease 
contains all the agreements made and entered into between the 
Tenant and the Landlord. 
35. LIGHTS ON EXTERIOR OP BUILDING. Tenant shall burn 
the lights affixed to the exterior of any building it occupies from 
one (l) hour after sunset to one fi) hour before sunrise nightly. 
±1 ~M> 
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36. OUTSIDE STORAGE: Other than self-propelled 
vehicles, nothing may be stored outside of a building without 
written consent of the Landlord. 
37. SECURITY DEPOSIT: Delete 
38. GARBAGE COLLECTION: Cost of garbage collection 
shall be borne by Tenant. Arrangement for such service shall be 
made by Tenant, subject to approval of Landlord. 
39. RULES AHD REGULATIONS: Landlord has found it 
necessary to post vehicular traffic control signs on streets and 
may from time to time impose certain traffic and parking rules and 
regulations at Freeport Center. Tenant agrees to comply with, and 
use reasonable efforts to cause its employees and other personnel, 
to comply with such posted signs and rules and regulations, and 
Tenant shall be responsible for causing its employees to park in 
designated areas and to operate their motor vehicles within posted 
speed limits and in accordance with other traffic signs. 
40. CONSTRUCTION OP LEASE: Words of any gender used in 
this Lease shall be held to include any other gender, and words in 
the singular number shall be held to include the plural when the 
sense requires. Interpretation, construction and performance of 
this Lease shall be governed by the laws of Utah. Each of the 
parties who execute this Lease as Tenant shall be jointly and 
severally liable for all obligations of Tenant under this Lease. 
41. PARAGRAPH HEADINGS: The paragraph headings as to 
the contents of particular paragraphs herein are inserted only for 
convenience and are in no way to be construed as part of such 
paragraph or as a limitation on the scope of the particular 
paragraph to which they refer. 
42. NOTICES: Any notice required or permitted to be 
given hereunder shall be deemed sufficient if given by communi-
cation in writing by express over-night mail, by public or private 
carrier, postage prepaid and certified, and addressed as follows: 
If to the Landlord, at the following address: 
FREEPORT CENTER ASSOCIATES 
P.0, Box 1325 - Preeport Center 
Clearfield, Utah 84016 
If to the Tenant, at the following address: 
ENERCO INC. 
45 North station Plaza 
Great Neck, NY 11021 
43. OPTION TO TERMINATE LEASE - Bldg. E-13 Sec, 3-A: 
Tenant shall have the option to terminate its other lease for Bldg. 
E-13 Sec. 3-A on the following conditions: 1) Tenant must provide 
Landlord 90 days written notice of its intent to terminate the 
Bldg. E-13 Sec. 3-A Lease; 2) Any termination shall be at the end 
of a month and; and 3) Tenant shall return the premises in a clean 
and structurally sound condition pursuant to the terms of the 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused these 
presents to be executed the day and year first above written. 
LANDLORD: 
FREEPORT CENTER ASSOCIATES 
I t s ~T>W3JU>£& 
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Michael L. Schwab [A4662], 
Lloyd A. Hardcastle [A507?] 
SCHWAB & HARDCASTLE 
225 South 200 West 
P.O. Box 118 
Farmington, Utah 84025Hj)ll8 
Telephone: (801) 451-6560 
Fax: (801) 451-8216 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE SECOND DIStRICT COURT OF THE JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
!,! Ill II III1!1: Ill'11 "!H D A V I S COIJINI I i !J II ,/ i Ill K " Ill "" III! Ill "' Ill 
ENERCO,, IMC 
AFFIDAVIT OF JANES KIM 
Plaintiff, 
v s , • 
S Q S S T A F F I N G S E R V I C E S ^ j N C m j , , ,, , I | | F i,, , (, f, ( , (j 
FREEPORT CENTER ASSOCIATES, 
et al , III III i n mi ih I e I Hi IIIIIII i II I  i / 
Defendants. 
The undersigned individual! James Kim, being duly sworn, 
hereby states the foJ 1 owing: 
1. I am the Managing Director for the plaintiff in this 
case , ENERCO, Inc •, a. kj, a: ENERCO of IJtah, Inc. I "ENERCO" ) . 
2 . I dill f i l l ly tlflii'i 1 { ai will Ih "I! In* I" rti "1 ss rtiifl c i. rciumst" anctts 
surrounding t h i s c a s e arid a l l s La tun IIIIIII lilts made below a r e based on my 
own personal knowledge. 
3 KNli 111,!1 n"! in 'I. i m I I'Li'11 b u s i l i e s n I | in iJieibitiiyi e j ^ t i i i i s i ve 
equipment, and other materials categorized as i i pint" Inn i t;tie 
1 
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U.S. Government in large nlotsn and reselling those items to other 
individuals and entities throughout the world. 
4. In 1995, ENERcOhad an extremely large warehouse at the 
Freeport Center in Clearfield/ Utah/ full of the type of equipment 
and materials referenced above, which ENERCO had purchased and was 
storing for future sale 
5. 
to its worldwide customers• 
In 1995, ENE^ CCJ had many millions of dollars worth of 
i 
such equipment stored at} its warehouse at the Freeport Center. The 
J 
i 
management of Freeport (tenter Associates ("Freeport") was aware of 
the unique type of equipment and materials I had in the warehouse, 
and also was aware of tfie! large volume of that equipment. 
6. I personally] entered into the lease agreements with 
Freeport on behalf of ENERCO. 
7. At the time thofce agreements were entered into, I spoke 
specifically with a Manager whose first name was "Steve." Because 
I ! 
of the high value of ENERCO! s property, I questioned him about 
i 
security at the Freeport Center. I was given verbal assurances and 
representations from him; regarding the security at the Freeport 
Center. Among other things, I was told that there would be 
security guards protecting the gate at the Freeport: Center, that 
nthere is ample security here," that ENERCO!s property would be 
safe, and that he h^d never heard of anyone stealing from 
Freeport1s tenants. 
8. These statements were very important to me in deciding to 
store ENERCOfs valuable goods at the Freeport Center, and I relied 
upon them in making my jdecision to do so. 
702/39 <Q» 191004 
9. At the !::::i me thje lease arrangements were m'\ In ' was gi^-an 
written materials " 3m§ Ereepor those ma Larials, J. I « • -is 
unequivocally stated th,r 
Freeport Center is 
chain link fencingL ; Gates are manned or locked during 
hours of darkness. 
center's 735 acres 
A roving security guard patrols the |oni weekends, at night and on holidays. 
sys tem' "! which was 
protected by five miles of ten foot 
10'. The materlaljs -given to me 11 -;u \\t\w i I 'I thiif the 
Freeporl: C E n tex wa s protected by i m i •» lectron i r survei 1 lance 
Jconnecled EH I li< Il i i' "HIi l l . e r 
Administrative Offices and patrol vehicle." I also relie , these 
written materials and the promises and representations made therein 
in 11 niiiixg t o s t o r e jENERCO's mat: si ; :: :!!; a 3! ,s an- ::i • & 3 11 i::i 5 11 1= lit 2 
•Freeport Cent 1 1 
] I 1 Il II II Il if ftu» t h p f l « ) " MI - i 
never given Freepor! ,.• , notice 01 u; whatsoeve ^ a r 
ENERCO would be ending jts lease or moving its property out of the 
Freeport '< "ttiil -."r. 
12. Freeport1 s front office knew that 1 ofter , went overseas 
on extended trips 9 and also knew that while 1 was on such, txi ps no 
1 
such trips, I, wouid leaye :my keys to the wa i: e house with Freeport! s 
fro 11 of f i ce so that no one else could gain a c 2 e ss tc the 
warehouse. 
13. Prior to the time when 1 left on my overseas trip during 
w h i c h t i n H i i e t f " 'mi 1 1  if 1 i t i l r w e n t tun F t p p f i i n I H 11! t 1 v mil 1 M | 1 n HUM! 
1 
the empl 1 1 1 n line 1 nil I 1 t LJidiL I would be out of town for an 
extended p e r i o d of tim^. As was my p r a c t i c e , 1 gave Freepor t" s 
^'07/99 18:29 © @002 
office the keys to my building so that no one else could gain 
access to the building while I was gone. All of the thefts 
occurred while Freeport had my keys and knew I was out of town. 
14* Based on the veribal promises and representations made by 
Freeport, the provisions of the written lease agreement, the fact 
that Freeport had my keys and knew I was out of town, and the other 
facts set forth in ENERCO's written answers to Freeport's 
Interrogatories in this ;case, I feel strongly that Freeport 
breached its agreements and promises made to me, and was negligc&nt 
i 
in allowing several million dollars of our property to be stolen. 
i 
1 5 . I have r e a d t h i s ! a f f i d a v i t and t h e s t a t e m e n t s made h e r e i n 
are t r u e and c o r r e c t . 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAITH NOT. 
J U L - 9 
DATED t h i s ;day o f J u l y , 1 9 9 9 . 
REPUBLIC OF KOREA ) 
STATE 0 f S i S ^ E 0 U L L 
UNITED STATE OP A&fifta}: S 
COUNTY OF )
 : 
i 
On the*"** ~ ^  ^ ^ day of July, 1999, personally appeared 
before, me Jamas Kim, whose identity has been proven on the basis of 
satisfactory evidence, being first duly sworn, acknowledges that he 
executed the foregoing instrument, for the purposes stated therein, 
of his own voluntary act, 
NOTARY PUBLIC i che le NT. Siders Vice Consul 
BXSHCQ\Aff-Ki«-702 
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